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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gabriel Hinders challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress
evidence found in his father’s vehicle. Mr. Hinders was driving his father’s vehicle, with his
father’s permission, when it ran out of gas. He temporarily parked the vehicle in a business’s
parking lot. That business called a police officer, who searched the car at least three times and
eventually found contraband. Mr. Hinders argued for suppression of the contraband due to the
warrantless search of the vehicle. The district court denied the motion, and Mr. Hinders
appealed. He argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police
officer had no lawful basis to search the vehicle.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On November 11, 2016, Mr. Hinders was driving his father’s vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I,1 p.37,
Ls.10–13, p.37, L.23–p.38, L.2.) His father had given him permission to drive the vehicle. (Tr.
Vol. I, p.37, L.23–p.38, L.2.) Mr. Hinders ran out of gas and tried to turn the vehicle into the
parking lot of an amusement facility, Triple Play. (Tr. Vol. I, p.38, Ls.19–21, p.39, Ls.10–14,
p.56, L.20.) A third party stopped and helped him move the vehicle the rest of the way into the
parking lot. (Tr. Vol. I, p.39, Ls.14–16.) The vehicle was parked in between two parking spots
and partially in the middle of the aisle of two parking spots rows. (See Ex. 1; R., p.74 (officer’s
photograph of parked vehicle); Tr. Vol. I, p.56, L.22–p.57, L.1.) The vehicle jutted out into the
aisle far enough that it somewhat impeded the ability for people and vehicles to move freely in
the aisle. (Tr., p.56, L.23–p.57, L.1, p.57, L.22–p.58, L.4.) The keys were left inside and at least
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There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the hearing on
Mr. Hinders’s motion to suppress, a hearing with the district court’s oral decision on
1

one of the windows was rolled down. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, Ls.21–23, p.44, L.21–p.45, L.1.)
Mr. Hinders did not remember what he did after he parked the vehicle at Triple Play. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.40, Ls.6–7.)
Kootenai County Sherriff’s Office Deputy Matthew Edwards was dispatched to Triple
Play around 1:00 p.m. that day. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.1–6.) Deputy Edwards was tasked with
locating the owner of the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.22–9, p.57, Ls.2–3.) The vehicle had a
license plate, but the Idaho State returns system was temporarily down for maintenance, so
Deputy Edwards could not get a return on the license place with his computer system. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.10, Ls.11–20, p.57, Ls.9–14.) Deputy Edwards then entered the vehicle on the passenger side
and looked in the glovebox. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, Ls.8–13.) He found the vehicle’s registration and
attempted to contact the registered owner, Mr. Hinders’s father. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, L.18–p.18, L.8,
p.31, Ls.16–16.) Unable to contact the owner, Deputy Edwards went into the vehicle a second
time to look for “more documentation” with names, phone numbers, or any other information
about “who might have been driving it.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, L.12–p.19, L.15.) During this second
search, Deputy Edwards found an employment application by Mr. Hinders. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20,
Ls.4–10.) He called Mr. Hinders, but was unable to contact him. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, Ls.11–15.)
Sometime after this, Deputy Edwards entered the car again to return the paperwork and saw a
clear plastic baggie with residue. (Tr. Vol. I, p.20, L.24–p.21, L.9, p.45, L.20–p.46, L.3.) The
baggie was on the passenger floorboard, below the glovebox, where a passenger would put his or
her feet. (Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.4–9.) Deputy Edwards identified the substance as cocaine. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.46, Ls.2–3.)

Mr. Hinders’s suppression motion, and a change of plea hearing. The second, cited as Volume II,
contains the sentencing hearing.
2

The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Hinders committed the crimes of
possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), and
possession of a legend drug, valium, without a prescription in violation of I.C. § 54-1732(3)(c).
(R., pp.7–8.) Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the
offenses and bound Mr. Hinders over to district court. (R., pp.42–45, 46.) The State charged
Mr. Hinders with possession of a controlled substance and possession of a legend drug.
(R., pp.49–50.)
Mr. Hinders moved to suppress the evidence obtained during and after the search of the
vehicle. (R., pp.47–48.) Mr. Hinders later filed a brief in support of his motion, arguing law
enforcement did not have a warrant or probable cause for the search. (R., pp.52–55.) The State
opposed the motion. (R., pp.57–63.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Hinders’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.64–71; Tr.
Vol. I, p.4, L.5–p.54, L.3.) At the start of the hearing, the district court found “no good cause”
for the lateness of Mr. Hinders’s brief in support of his motion, even though the motion itself
was timely. (Tr. Vol. I, p4, Ls.20–22, p.6, Ls.3–6.) Nevertheless, the district court declined to
consider the brief “as an untimely filed document.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.6, Ls.10–11.) Deputy Edwards
and Mr. Hinders testified. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.8, L.17–p.49, L.18.) After the hearing, the district
court allowed for supplemental briefing and took the matter under advisement.
In Mr. Hinders’s supplemental brief, he argued he had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle, Deputy Edwards had no lawful authority to impound, tow, or search the
vehicle, and the search did not fall under the community caretaking exception. (R., pp.75–87,
88–89.) The State responded and argued Mr. Hinders did not have a legitimate privacy interest in
the vehicle because he abandoned it. (R., pp.91–92.)
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The district court issued an oral ruling on the motion. (Tr., p.56, L.5–p.60, L.25.) The
district court first ruled Mr. Hinders had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and
therefore could challenge the search. (Tr. Vol. I, p.58, L.23–p.59, L.8.) Second, the district court
ruled Deputy Edwards never determined whether the vehicle was abandoned, as defined by
statute, to trigger the vehicle’s removal and storage. (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.10–25.) The district
court reasoned, “[T]he police just never got to that stage to determine whether this was an
abandoned vehicle or not. They were attempting to determine that this was an abandoned
vehicle.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.59, Ls.22–25.) The district court went on to hold:
The Court is going to find that this was a lawful search under the circumstances.
That it was reasonable for the police to enter into that vehicle a few times to try to
determine who the owner was. To try to be able to determine was it abandoned?
Was the owner or operator going to be coming back and move that vehicle?
Who’s responsible for it? Whether they should tag it; whether they should just
move it themselves.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.59, L.25–p.60, L.8.) Due to the lawful search, the district court held the discovery
of contraband on the floorboard “seen in plain view in a place where the police had a right to be;
that is, inside the vehicle attempting to determine the abandonment of the vehicle” was also
lawful. (Tr. Vol. I, p.60, Ls.9–14.) The district court further held the community caretaking
exception did not apply. (Tr. Vol. I, p.60, Ls.15–17.) Rather, the district court explained:
The Court simply finds that this was, although without a warrant, a reasonable
entry into this vehicle for the purposes of determining the owner of the vehicle
and then contraband seen in plain view while the police were reasonably in a
place that they had a right to be conducting duties that they were conducting to
determine abandonment, ownership or not.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.60, Ls.17–23.) The district court denied the motion and issued an order
accordingly. (Tr. Vol. I, p.60, Ls.24–25; R., p.95.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Hinders entered a conditional plea to both charged
offenses. (Tr. Vol. I, p.64, Ls.6–10, p.64, Ls.14–16, p.73, L.20–p.74, L.4, p.75, L.21–p.76, L.22.)
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He reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.64, Ls.14–16, p.67, Ls.5–12, R., pp.100–01.) The district court withheld judgment and placed
Mr. Hinders on probation for two years. (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, L.24–p.9, L.1; R., pp.105–07, 112.)
Mr. Hinders timely appealed. (R., pp.113–15.)

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hinders’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hinders’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hinders contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress

because Deputy Edwards’s search of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
unreasonable searches. Deputy Edwards had no lawful basis to enter the vehicle—he did not
have a warrant, probable cause, or other statutory grounds to search. Moreover, even if Deputy
Edwards could momentarily enter the vehicle to obtain its registration, he far exceeded the scope
of that search by entering the vehicle at least two more times to search for more information. Due
to the unlawful search, the district court should have granted Mr. Hinders’s motion to suppress.
B.

Standard of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). The Court will accept the trial court’s
findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.” State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014).
The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the
facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.
C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Hinders’s Motion To Suppress Because
Deputy Edwards’s Warrantless Search Of The Vehicle, Without Probable Cause,
Violated The Fourth Amendment
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). It guarantees
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
“Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule,
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which requires unlawfully seized evidence to be excluded.” State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 647
(2017) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); State v. Page, 140 Idaho
841, 846 (2004)). “Searches conducted without a warrant are considered per se unreasonable
unless they fall into one of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to this
general rule.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 815
(2009)). The State bears the burden to show the warrantless search falls within a well-recognized
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833
(2002).
In the case at hand, Deputy Edwards conducted a warrantless search of Mr. Hinders’s
vehicle. It is undisputed Deputy Edwards did not have a warrant. As such, the State has the
burden to prove Deputy Edwards’s warrantless search fell within an exception to the warrant
requirement. The State has not met its burden.
One exception to a warrantless search is the “automobile exception.” This exception
“allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706
(2012) (citing State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 800 (1998)). Here, there was no probable cause to
believe Mr. Hinders’s vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. “Probable cause is
established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search
would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable person—to a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. The circumstances known to Deputy
Edwards at the time of the search would not give rise to a fair probability of contraband or
evidence of a crime in Mr. Hinders’s vehicle. Deputy Edwards responded to a call from Triple
Play regarding an improperly parked vehicle. An improperly parked vehicle does not create
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probable cause to justify a warrantless search. Further, the rolled down window and keys left
inside do not change this outcome. There was no evidence the vehicle was stolen, involved in an
accident, or otherwise linked to any criminal activity. Rather, Deputy Edwards was simply
attempting to determine whether the vehicle was abandoned, which would grant him the
statutory authority to remove the vehicle. See I.C. §§ 49-1801(2), -1804, -1806. These facts do
not give rise to probable cause for a warrantless search.2
Deputy Edwards lacked not only any constitutional authority to search, but also any
statutory authority. Idaho Code § 49-1801 prohibits abandonment of a vehicle “upon public or
private property without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful
possession or control of the property.” I.C. § 49-1801(2). Once certain requirements are met, an
officer may remove the vehicle to a garage or nearest place of safety. See I.C. §§ 49-662, -1803,
1803A, -1804. For example, an officer may remove a vehicle after a forty-eight hour notice
period if he has “reasonable grounds to believe” the vehicle is abandoned. I.C. § 49-1804. The
officer must make “[a] reasonable attempt” to notify the vehicle’s owner by telephone within the
notice period. I.C. § 49-1801. The officer’s inability to notify the owner “shall not preclude” the
vehicle’s removal. I.C. § 49-1804. In other circumstances, an officer may remove a vehicle
immediately. For instance, an officer may take into custody and remove a vehicle “reported as
stolen and not recovered” without advance notice, provided the owner is notified in writing after
the removal. I.C. § 49-1803(1)–(2). Similarly, if an unauthorized or abandoned vehicle interferes

2

In the district court, State did not argue that Deputy Edwards could search the vehicle pursuant
to the automobile exception. (R., pp.57–63, 91–92.) “Issues not raised below will not be
considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case
was presented to the lower court.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, Mr. Hinders merely argues against the automobile exception in
an abundance of caution and to underscore for this Court the absence of any legal grounds for
Deputy Edwards to search the vehicle.
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with access to, use, and enjoyment of private property, an authorized officer may “immediately
proceed to have the vehicle removed to a garage or nearest place of safety.” I.C. § 49-1806(3).
At the time of removal, the officer must complete a “towed vehicle notice,” including, among
other things, (a) the owner’s name and address, (b) date, time and reason for tow, and (c)
vehicle’s appraisal value and daily storage rate. I.C. § 49-1803A(2). This notice must be
provided to the owner at the scene or mailed within ninety-six hours. I.C. § 49-1803A(3). Once a
vehicle is towed, “[r]easonable efforts shall be made to secure and prevent further damage to
vehicles being stored.” I.C. § 49-1808. Noticeably absent from these statutory guidelines is a
grant of authority to search the vehicle. Pursuant to these statutes, officers are permitted to
remove and store vehicles and attempt to notify the owners. Nothing in this statutory scheme
allows officers to search vehicles during the removal process.
Accordingly, the district court’s creation of a new exception to the warrant requirement to
“enter into [the] vehicle a few times to determine who the owner was” was in error. (See Tr. Vol.
I, p.60, Ls.2–4.) The warrant requirement has only a few “narrowly drawn” and “specifically
established” exceptions, and the search of a parked vehicle to determine the owner is not one of
them. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706.
Further, Deputy Edwards’s temporary lack of access to his computer system did not also
temporarily diminish Mr. Hinders’s constitutional protections. There is no Fourth Amendment
exception for inconvenience to a police officer. Deputy Edwards had no constitutional authority
to enter the vehicle and search for its registration, regardless of his computer system access. If
Deputy Edwards initiated removal proceedings, he could have easily complied with the notice
requirements once the computer system maintenance was complete. See I.C. §§ 49-1803A(3), 1804, -1806. Therefore, the district court erred by determining Deputy Edwards could search the
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vehicle multiple times to find its registration. That search was not authorized by statute or the
Fourth Amendment. The district court should have suppressed the contraband found in the
vehicle during Deputy Edwards’s search.
Finally, even if a search was reasonable to determine the owner of the vehicle, Deputy
Edwards far exceeded the scope of that limited search. “The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated
searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” State v. Rios, 160
Idaho 262, 264 (2016) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). A reasonable
search in this situation would permit Deputy Edwards to enter the vehicle and retrieve the
vehicle’s registration. But this search must be strictly tied to its justification and limited in scope.
“[A]search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of
its intolerable intensity and scope. The scope of the search must be strictly tied to and justified by
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17–19
(1968) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, a search of the vehicle for the registration
would be limited to the areas in which the registration might be found, such as the glovebox or
center console. Further, once the registration is found, there is no longer any justification a
continued or repeated search. Deputy Edwards’s search went beyond these limitations. He
reentered the vehicle at least two more times to search for additional documentation after he
found the vehicle’s registration. These searches were without a lawful justification and far
exceeded the scope of a reasonable search under the circumstances. Therefore, Deputy
Edwards’s search which uncovered contraband in the vehicle was unreasonable. The district
court should have granted Mr. Hinders’s motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hinders respectfully requests this Court reverse or vacate the district court’s order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate his withheld judgment, and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2018.

____/S/_____________________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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